This paper argues that, despite the widespread assumption that everyone has an absolute right to hold any religious belief whatever, no matter how bizarre or irrational, there are limits to responsible belief. Epistemic responsibility means that we are not entitled to hold beliefs that, by recognized epistemic methods, have been discredited. The paper distinguishes epistemic responsibility from legal and from moral responsibility. Because our beliefs tend to affect our behavior, epistemically irresponsible beliefs become morally irresponsible when they conduce to discrimination (...) or harm. To insist that scripture and religious doctrine must be believed literally and in every detail is epistemically irresponsible, because they have been shown to be, at many points, inconsistent with well-established scientific and historical knowledge. Such beliefs are morally irresponsible when they encourage racism or discrimination against women, gays and lesbians, ethnic groups, the poor, or any other individual or group. (shrink)

This paper argues that, despite the widespread assumption that everyone has an absolute right to hold any religious belief whatever, no matter how bizarre or irrational, there are limits to responsible belief. Epistemic responsibility means that we are not entitled to hold beliefs that, by recognized epistemic methods, have been discredited. The paper distinguishes epistemic responsibility from legal and from moral responsibility. Because our beliefs tend to affect our behavior, epistemically irresponsible beliefs become morally irresponsible when they conduce to discrimination (...) or harm. To insist that scripture and religious doctrine must be believed literally and in every detail is epistemically irresponsible, because they have been shown to be, at many points, inconsistent with well-established scientific and historical knowledge. Such beliefs are morally irresponsible when they encourage racism or discrimination against women, gays and lesbians, ethnic groups, the poor, or any other individual or group. (shrink)

Sayers announces that his objective in this book is to develop and defend a realist account of knowledge. It is an epistemology in the Marxist tradition which extends the theories of Lenin and Engels and attempts to correct what is admittedly unsatisfactory in their position. By a realist epistemology Sayers means one that affirms an objective, material world, existing independently of consciousness, but knowable by consciousness. It is a materialist theory in the sense that it denies the existence of consciousness (...) independent of matter and affirms that all reality is ultimately material. It affirms a reflection theory of knowledge—that the objective world can be known by consciousness only because consciousness is a reflection of reality. Without such a reflective connection between consciousness and objective reality, an unbridgeable gap is created and knowledge is impossible. This is the trouble with traditional empiricist, rationalist, and Kantian positions which make knowledge merely a matter of contemplating our own ideas which may or may not resemble objective reality. (shrink)

Sayers announces that his objective in this book is to develop and defend a realist account of knowledge. It is an epistemology in the Marxist tradition which extends the theories of Lenin and Engels and attempts to correct what is admittedly unsatisfactory in their position. By a realist epistemology Sayers means one that affirms an objective, material world, existing independently of consciousness, but knowable by consciousness. It is a materialist theory in the sense that it denies the existence of consciousness (...) independent of matter and affirms that all reality is ultimately material. It affirms a reflection theory of knowledge—that the objective world can be known by consciousness only because consciousness is a reflection of reality. Without such a reflective connection between consciousness and objective reality, an unbridgeable gap is created and knowledge is impossible. This is the trouble with traditional empiricist, rationalist, and Kantian positions which make knowledge merely a matter of contemplating our own ideas which may or may not resemble objective reality. (shrink)

There have been and continue to be disagreements about how to consider the traditional square of opposition and the traditional inferences of obversion, conversion, contraposition and inversion from the perspective of contemporary quantificational logic. Philosophers have made many different attempts to save traditional inferences that are invalid when they involve empty classes. I survey some of these attempts and argue that the only satisfactory way of saving all the traditional inferences is to make the existential assumption that both the subject (...) and predicate classes and their complement classes are non-empty for all the propositions we admit. I briefly indicate the room for continued controversy over how properly to interpret Aristotle?s statements regarding these inferences, but find some plausibility in the views of Manley Thompson and A.N.Prior that Aristotle had in mind a particular arrangement of existential import unfamiliar to most contemporary logicians. (shrink)

The social novel ought not to be confused with didacticism in literature and ought not to be expected to provide prescriptions for the cure of social ills. Neither should it necessarily be viewed as ephemeral. After examining justifications of the social novel offered by William Dean Howells (in the 1880s) and Jonathan Franzen (in the 1990s), the author explores the way in which social novels alter perceptions and responses at levels of sensibility that are not usually susceptible to rational argument, (...) push back moral horizons, contribute to the creation of social conscience, and expose the complexity and contextuality of moral discernment. As a concrete example, Howells's 1889 novel "A Hazard of New Fortunes" is analyzed (and defended against its detractors) in terms of its sophisticated treatment of the dilemmas that arise from a recognition of personal complicity in structural sin, its disclosure of the context-indexed evolution of values, and its attention to the importance and fragility of social trust. (shrink)

Der Beitrag fragt nach dem Stellenwert des Normalitätsbegriffs im Diskurs der Behinderung. Ausgangspunkt ist die These, dass Normalität und Normativität analytisch voneinander getrennt werden müssen. In der heutigen Normalisierungsgesellschaft existieren sowohl wertbezogene, präskriptive ("normative") als auch statistisch fundierte, deskriptive ("normalistische") Normen. Außerdem lassen sich zwei Normalisierungsstrategien kennzeichnen: ein starr ausgrenzender, normierender Ansatz ("Protonormalismus") und eine flexible, normalisierende Strategie ("flexibler Normalismus"). Auf dieser theoretischen Folie wird diskutiert, ob sich im behindertenpolitischen Diskurs und in sozialpolitischen Konzepten Tendenzen der flexiblen Normalisierung auffinden lassen. (...) Der Schwerpunkt des Beitrags liegt auf einer normalitätstheoretischen Analyse der beiden Klassifikationsmodelle der Weltgesundheitsorganisation. Die "International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps" (ICIDH 1980) blieb noch der wertbezogenen Normativität verhaftet. Dagegen stellt die "International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health" (ICF 2001) die normalistische (Vergleichs-)Norm ins Zentrum und formuliert das Gebot der Selbstnormalisierung. (shrink)

(2003). Intellectuals for our times. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 6, The Public Role of Intellectuals, pp. 33-50. doi: 10.1080/1369823042000241258.

Chater & Loewenstein (C&L) ignore the long history by which social scientists have developed more nuanced and ultimately more helpful ways to understand the relationship between persons and situations. This tradition is reflected and advanced in a large literature on “wise” social–psychological or mindset interventions, which C&L do not discuss yet mischaracterize.